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Abstract This paper relates the cost-benefit analysis (CBA) results of transportation
policy proposals in the Netherlands with the decision to implement or abandon the
proposal. The aim of this study is to explore the relation between the CBA results
and decision-making. Multinomial logit regression models and Latent Class Analysis
are used in this paper as the statistical tools to identify associations between CBA
results and decisions and to reveal unobservable classes underlying the CBA results
and the decisions for projects. Analysis was carried out on 106 Netherlands CBA
reports (2000–2012) containing 454 observations. Each observation is a CBA result
of a transport project variant. In line with most of the international literature, this
study cannot find a significant association between Net Present Values (NPVs) and
the variants chosen in political decisions (after controlling for other relevant variables).
However, a positive NPV does keep variants ‘pending’, preventing a negative decision.
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1 Introduction
In many countries, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) of transport projects has become com-
mon practice over the last two decades (Willis et al. 1998; Lee 2000; Hayashi and
Morisugi 2000; Nakamura 2000; Odgaard et al. 2005; Annema et al. 2007; Mackie
andKelly 2007;World Bank 2010). However, the role of the CBA in political decision-
making processes is a complex one. A priori, the expectation is that transport project
proposals with a larger expected social return have a higher chance of being approved
by politicians. Nevertheless, as our literature review shows, there is an increasing
amount of evidence that CBA outcomes have only a limited impact on political
decision-making.
Our study analyses the CBA’s for transport projects in The Netherlands between
2000 and 2012. In contrast to most earlier studies (Table 1), which focused on road
projects, we include all types of transport projects. Furthermore, we have collected
data for both national and regional projects. As such, our study is the first large-scale,
systematic statistical analysis on the impact of a CBA outcome on political decision-
making.
The paper is structured as follows. We present a literature review in Sect. 2 and
produce some contextual information in Sect. 3. Section 4 discusses the methods and
Sect. 5 the results. We end with some concluding remarks (Sect. 6).
2 Literature overview
Since the 1970s several scholars have studied the relationship between CBA out-
comes and transportation decision-making (Table 1). Only the oldest two studies found
(McFadden 1975, 1976) show a clear relation: decisions on highway routing in the
1970s in the US could be partly explained by the BCRs of these highway routings.
All other and more recent international studies show a limited or no statistical rela-
tion between decisions and composite CBA information such as the benefit to cost
ratio (BCR) and the net present value (NPV), as shown in Table 1. Interestingly,
some studies conclude that other (CBA) information than the composite results was
used in the decision such as in the studies by Fridstrom and Elvik (1997), Nellthorp
and Mackie (2000), and Odeck (2010). For example, Fridstrom and Elvik (1997)
concluded that costs were weighed relatively heavy and that smaller projects were
preferred to larger projects, given the BCR. Inspired by these international studies
we will also not only evaluate composite CBA information but also CBA compo-
nents.
Concerning the usage of CBAs, a World Bank (2010) study also showed that their
use of CBAs dropped considerably in the past decades. And, Proost et al. (2011) make
clear that political decisions for multi-billion EU transport infrastructure projects are
even made without support from CBA results. Here, the Dutch CBA practice is dif-
ferent (see also next section), because since the start of the Dutch CBA practice
in 2000 CBAs have been made mandatory for large projects and have also been
carried a substantial number of smaller projects and for a variety of transporta-
tion project categories. Possibly, due to this popularity, we might expect a priori
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that in Dutch decision-making CBA results play a more influential role in decision-
making.
Nevertheless, in general the international literature points out that CBA results
hardly affect actual decision-making. Although there is a huge knowledge base giving
explanations why decision-makers use knowledge to a limited extent (e.g., Bax 2011;
Landry et al. 2001; Kasemir et al. 2003), literature which explains whyCBA results are
hardly influential is scarce. Annema (2013) speculates that five barriers might explain
the limited use of CBA results. One barrier might be related to a CBA often being just
one part of a considerable amount of information about projectswhich decision-makers
have to digest. So, he thinks it plausible to assume that some decision-makers just miss
the CBA information, forget about it when the time of final decision-making arrives or
do simplynot have the time to really scrutinize theCBA information received.A second
barrier is possibly a lack of understanding. A third family of barriers mentioned might
be related to acceptance and trust. Politicians—even the ones who actually understand
the CBA—may not accept the normative premises of the technique or they may not
trust the effects estimated. A broad fourth barrier category distinguished by Annema
(2013) was denoted as ‘political’. For example, some politicians may just think that
expert techniques should not provide the final answer. Or, politiciansmay take only the
sentiments of the regional or local community into account whenmaking a decision on
building new infrastructure. Annema deems it logical to assume that the four barriers
mentionedmight reinforce each other, resulting in a fifth ‘reinforcing’ barrier. Perhaps,
as (Annema 2013, p. 306) states ‘it is more a miracle that CBA information has been
used in some mega-project cases at all’.
If in the Netherlands practice between 2000 and 2012 CBA information was used
at all, we will now analyze.
3 Context
For most transportation projects in the Netherlands it is compulsory to carry out a
CBA in the decision-making process. However, it is not mandatory to act according
to the CBA results. Consequently, a project with a highly negative Net Present Value
(NPV) can still be implemented if the project receives a majority vote in parliament
and/or in the regional councils. In other words, in the Dutch political context CBA is
seen as a mandatory input in the decision-making process, but the tool is not meant to
replace the political decision-making.
CBA is used for a wide range of projects. In 2000 the Dutch government
decided that conducting a CBA was mandatory for large infrastructure transporta-
tion projects and should follow a CBA guide (Eijgenraam et al. 2000). Like in the
newest guide to Cost-Benefit Analysis of the European Commission (EC 2014),
the Dutch CBA practice relates to a broad welfare analysis, thus, including eval-
uation of non-market impacts of transport projects. In the period 2000 and 2012
it became customary to also apply CBA to smaller investment projects, for non-
investment projects such as road pricing, for regional projects and so forth. In
2012 CBAs were made mandatory for all national projects included in the so-called
‘Long-range Plan for Spatial and Transport Projects’ (MIRT in Dutch) and for all
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regional projects which require a subsidy from the national government exceeding
112.5 million Euros1 (in 2010 prices, Ministry of Infrastructure and the Environment
2012)2 In the Netherlands a CBA is used to evaluate individual projects and not,
as is sometimes the case in Scandinavia (Table 1), as a tool for ranking projects.
Cost and benefits are computed from an economic point of view, including non-
monetary effects such as travel time for consumers or CO2 emissions. The CBA
metric used in Dutch practice is NPV, as this is prescribed in Netherlands CBA guide-
lines. In some CBA reports additional metrics are presented, such as the BCR or
the (internal) rate of return, but this is not standard practice. Therefore, our analysis
solely focusses on NPV as a main potential explanatory variable (see next sec-
tion) for decisions and not on other CBA metrics such as the (economic) rate of
return (see Del Bo and Florio 2010, for an analysis of this metric in ex ante project
appraisal).
For more technical details on the Dutch CBA practice we refer to the CBA guides
(Eijgenraam et al. 2000; Romijn and Renes 2013). Basically, the Dutch practice
entails a state-of-the-art approach from problem analysis, establishing baseline alter-
natives, defining policy alternatives, estimating and valuing costs and effect of the
policy alternatives compared to the baseline alternatives (for transport impacts often
using transport modelling), calculating all costs and benefits discounted to the same
base year and calculating the NPV. Annema et al. (2007) have evaluated 7 years
of Dutch CBA transportation evaluation in depth. They have analyzed both con-
tents as well as process related issues. For a discussion on attitudes of key actors
in the Dutch Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) practice towards the role of CBA in
the decision-making process for infrastructure projects, we refer to Mouter et al.
(2013).
In this research 106 CBA reports are analyzed concerning transport policies (see
next section). As remarked earlier ex ante transportation CBAs in the Netherlands
are used in the decision-making process for a wide range of transport projects:
from relatively small local projects such as new locks in inland waterways (tens
of million euro investments) to very large and expensive high speed rail infrastruc-
ture projects connecting the Netherlands with Belgium or Germany (billions of
euro). Next to investment projects also transport policies such as road pricing,
increasing speed limits and abandoning Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) as trans-
port fuel have been scrutinized with CBA. The median investment costs of all
transport projects considered in this analyses is 0.4 billion (Table 3). The Nether-
lands decision-makers do not receive only CBA information to make their decision
but also Environmental Impact Assessment reports and eventually other reports
on, for example, regional employment impacts, EU funding opportunities and so
forth.
1 For urbanized regional regions around Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam the cut-off is 225 million
Euros.
2 In 2013 the Dutch government published a letter (with a new general CBA guideline as appendix) in
which they announced that CBA will also be used in decision-making outside the domain of transport
(Ministry of Finance 2013).
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4 Methods
The methods used in this paper include document analysis, Multinominal Logit Mod-
eling (MNL) and Latent Class Modeling (LCM). Document analysis is used to collect
quantitativeCBA information (e.g., Net PresentValue) for each project evaluated using
CBA in the period 2000–2012 and to determine the political decisions per project. This
information is used, amongst others, to estimate the MNL and LC models. We will
now elaborate on the three methods used.
Document analyses to find information Quantitative potential decision-influencing
information was distilled out of 106 CBA reports.3 Our aim was to include as many
transportation CBA reports as possible, for which a snowball method was used. We
started with two smaller existing CBA report collections (Rienstra 2008 and TU Eind-
hoven) and by using internet and the authors’ network the collection was extended.
Our collection is large but cannot be considered to be the whole population of projects
for which a CBA was carried out.
The 106 CBA reports analyzed contain 454 project variants, or specific designs.
For example, one project aimed to expand the highway network around Amsterdam
Airport Schiphol. This expansion can be designed in many different ways such as
two or three lanes or trajectories more to the north or to the south of the airport, and
so forth. Each ‘different way’ of designing this project scrutinized with a CBA is a
so-called project variant.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the various project variants and three
categorical variables considered in this paper as decision-influencing information
(explanatory variables). The first categorical variable is the project category which
may influence decisions as politicians may prefer certain project categories regardless
of the CBA outcomes. As shown in Table 2, in the MNL and LC models used in this
study the project categories are aggregated into three categories: road, rail and other
transport projects such as sea ports, air ports and inland waterways projects. This
avoids empty cells in the cross-tabulation between this variable and the dependent
variable (the no go/go decision), which would lead to estimation problems. We have
tried to estimate models with more then three project categories but these attempts
did not result in meaningful results. The project category ‘road pricing’ is excluded
from the models (see Table 2) because the variants were all rejected, despite the fact
that 85 % of the pricing project variants scrutinized showed positive to very positive
NPVs. Including this category in the analysis distorted the regression and LCA. More
importantly, modelling this category provides little information: for this category there
is hardly a logical relation between CBA results and decision-making.
The second categorical explanatory variable is the spatial scale of the project vari-
ants proposed which might also influence decisions regardless of the CBA outcomes.
The scale ‘International’ concerns transport policy proposals aiming to improve the
connection between the Netherlands and foreign countries, e.g. a high speed rail link,
3 Thus, qualitative information, if included, was ignored. Some cost or benefit items are hard to monetize
and were given labels such as PM (‘Pro Memorie’ is Latin for ‘keep in mind’) or plusses or minuses in the
main CBA table. In order to carry out a quantitative analysis we did not include this qualitative information
in our database.
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Table 2 Overview of project categories, reports, variants and the average amount of variants per report per
project category, spatial scale and CPB involvement
CBA reports Project variants Category as assigned
to in the MNL model
and LCA
Project variant
Roads 26 152 Road
Rail persons 15 70 Rail
Road pricing (including toll roads) 11 50 Excluded in the models
Inland waterways 14 35 Other
Public transport (no heavy rail) 7 43 Other
Rail freight 6 25 Rail
Seaports 8 22 Other
Construction works (e.g., bridges) 9 31 Other
Airports 3 14 Other
Other (e.g., increasing speed limits) 7 12 Other
Total 106 454
Spatial scale
International 20 73 International
National 45 194 National
Regional 41 187 Regional
Total 106 454
CPB involvement 37 200 CPB involved
airport improvements. The national government is the level of decision-making for
these international projects. ‘National’ projects refer to transport policy proposals
intended to improve the national transport system (e.g., highway projects, pricing,
implementing other speed limits on highways). Also for these national spatial scale
projects the national government makes the decisions. For a regional transport policy
proposal, the regional authorities (often combined with the national decision-making
level for additional funding) are the main decision-makers.
A third categorical variable which might influence decision-making is ‘CPB
involvement’. CPB stands for the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis,
an independent economic research institute which both carries out CBAs themselves
or provides second opinions on CBAs made by others. The CPB is regarded in the
Netherlands as an institution delivering high-quality CBAs or as ‘the big stick’ encour-
aging other CBA authors to deliver a high quality CBA, knowing that the CPB will
carry out a second opinion.Moreover, theCPB results often get a lot ofmedia attention.
Thus, a priori, our hypothesis is that ‘CPB involvement’ may influence the quality of a
CBA and the CBA’s impact on decision making. Therefore, we included this category
in our models. In around 45 % of the project variants the CPB was involved.
Table 3 presents the continuous explanatory variables used in our models. These
variables capture the main results of the CBA reports. Five variables can be found in
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Table 3 Overview of CBA variables used
N Mean Median Standard deviation
Billion Euro
Investment costs (PV) 454 1.1 0.4 1.7
Transport benefits (PV) 440 1.2 0.3 3.2
Indirect effects (PV) 215 −0.2 0.1 2.3
External effects (PV) 286 0.3 0.0 2.1
Net present value (NPV) 454 −0.1 0.0 3.0
Relative NPV 454 0.6 0.3 4.9
Ratio
Inverse of number of variants 454 0.27 0.20 0.25
the CBA reports which may influence decision-making: the Net Present Value (NPV)
and the Present Values (PVs) of the initial investment costs, transport benefits (mainly
travel time gains), indirect effects and external effects (mainly environmental impacts).
In the Netherlands the indirect effects relate to the impact of a project on markets
other than the transport market. Additionally, we constructed three extra variables
which might affect decision-making: ‘relative NPV’ signifies the difference between
the NPV of a project variant and the NPV of the project variant with the highest NPV.
Our assumption was that decision-makers were more likely to choose the variant with
the highest relative NPV. The ‘Inverse of number of variants’ variable represents the
amount of variants scrutinized per project. A priori, our assumption was that a variant
has a lower chance of being chosen if it is part of a relatively large collection of
variants. To be clear, the lower the inverse number for a project is, the more variants
there are. Finally, we used the variable ‘year’ signifying the ‘age’ of the CBA report.
The assumption is that decision-making in the early days of the CBA practice (in the
early 2000s) might differ from the more recent decision-making practice.
We did not evaluate the quality of the CBAs. Nor were any corrections on the data
carried out. The reason is that we aim to relate the CBA outcomes as presented to the
decision-maker to their decisions, regardless of whether this information was correct
or not.
Some original CBA data was processed. In about 75% of the 106 CBA reports point
estimates of the present values for the variables distinguished were presented in the
summary and conclusions. In the other 25% the results were presented in bandwidths,
for example, using a low, middle and high economic growth scenario. In this way the
CBA authors were able to indicate to the decision-makers the influence of future
uncertainty on the PV outcomes. The reports which only presented point estimates
sometimes included amore subtle picture by addressing future uncertainty somewhere
in the report (e.g., qualitatively or in an appendix). For our analysis we used the main
outcomes as presented in the summary and conclusion as input, on the assumption
that decision-makers also focused on the main results presented in the CBA reports.
In our models point estimates are only used for the five variables (Table 3). The data
presented in a bandwidth was therefore changed into point estimates using the middle
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scenario estimates, or the average of low and high if only those two estimates were
presented, or with only the low or high estimate if only the low or high estimate was
presented in the summary or conclusion.
As Table 3 shows, transport benefits, indirect and external effects could not be
found in the CBA reports of all 454 cases. Sometimes results were presented on an
aggregated level which meant that we (and, of course, also the decision-maker using
these CBAs) could not clearly distinguish between these types of effects. In addition,
indirect and external effects were not always included or were only included in a
qualitative way.
After exclusion of the pricing projects,missing values only occurred on the variables
indirect effects and external effects. Inclusion of these missing values would result in
a sample size of only 125 (i.e. after listwise deletion). To still be able to take these
variables into account in the analysis, we replaced missing values by zero’s. We note
that the impact of CBA on decision makers is determined by their impression of
CBA results, which is not necessarily the same as the CBA results themselves. We
assumed that missing values for indirect and/or external effects give decision makers
the impression that these effects are zero or negligible. Below, we return to this matter.
Document analysis was used to determine the final decision of each project. Three
categories of decisions were distinguished: ‘go’, ‘no go’ or ‘pending/unknown’. Offi-
cial government documents and newspaper items were used for each project variant
to determine whether a final go or no go decision was taken, or whether the decision
was still pending at the time of our research (in 2013).4
Multinomial logitmodelsToassess the influenceof the independent variables (Tables 2,
3) on the final decision (‘go’/‘no go’/‘pending’) several multinomial logit models
were estimated. In the computation of standard errors it is normally assumed that each
observation is independent of all other observations in the data set. However, in our
particular case, the project variants of a certain project are likely to be correlated.
To account for these intra-class correlations clustered robust standard errors were
computed (Rogers 1994) using the projects as the clustering variable.
The latent class cluster model In addition to running standard MNL regressions, we
were also interested in examining our dataset in a more explorative way. In particular,
we were interested in identifying clusters of projects that were similar with respect
4 It should be noted that it was not always clear which project variant was finally chosen. For example,
one project proposal related to extending the highway capacity around Schiphol Amsterdam Airport and
the city of Amsterdam. 16 different highway project variants were evaluated using CBA. One main variant
related to building new highway stretches in 8 different sub-variants. Another main variant related to only
extending existing highways with extra lanes, also with 8 sub-variants. In the final official policy document
it became clear which main variant was chosen but to identify with 100 % certainty which sub-variant
(one of the 8) was actually chosen was not possible, not even after calling the people who were actually
involved in the decision. Thus, some errors on sub-variant level may have been made in our analysis. Also,
categorizing decisions as ‘pending’ or ‘no go’ is less clear-cut than might be expected. As a rule we took the
final decision document or newspaper clipping as the starting point. If it was made clear on paper that the
final decision was not clear yet, the project decision was categorized as ‘pending’. If it was made clear that
the political body which decides (e.g., the city of Groningen municipality council voted against building a
city tram for which a CBA had been carried out) said ‘no go’, the decision was categorized as ‘no go’. Even
if the newspaper carrying this news (for example) said that it was imaginable that after the election the new
council (with a different political composition perhaps) might still decide to implement the project.
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to the various characteristics (Tables 2, 3) and see what relation these clusters had
to the final decision (‘go’/‘no go’/‘pending’). Our aim with this analysis was to shed
light on the question as to what types of projects exist (i.e. with specific configurations
with respect to the various characteristics) and which project-types are most/least
likely to be implemented. To this end, a latent class cluster model was specified and
estimated.5 To account for the correlations between the observations the projects (and
not the project variants) were identified as the primary sampling units.
Latent class analysis (LCA) is a model-based (probabilistic) clustering technique
(Magidson and Vermunt 2004; McCutcheon 1987). As such, it has several benefits
over traditional clustering techniques like K-means cluster analysis, namely that (1)
misclassification biases are reduced, (2) statistical criteria can be used to judge the
optimal number of classes, (3) the significance of the model parameters can be com-
puted and assessed and (4) variables of the mixed-scale type can be accommodated
(Magidson and Vermunt 2002). This latter benefit is especially relevant to our appli-
cation given that the project characteristics (Tables 2, 3) represent a mix of nominal
and continuous variables.
In LCA the goal is to find the most parsimonious model, i.e. with the smallest num-
ber of latent classeswhich adequately describe the associations between the indicators.
To identify the optimal model, subsequent models were estimated with 1 through 10
latent classes. The Log-Likelihood did not improve greatly after the 5-class solution.
Additionally, beyond the 5-class models the clusters also started to overlap in a quali-
tative sense. Therefore, the choice was made to present the 5-class model in the results
(see below).
5 Results
The relationship between NPV and the decision To gain an initial sense of whether and
towhat extent there is a relationship between theNPVand the final project decision,we
dichotomized the NPV into two categories (positive and negative) and cross-tabulated
the distribution with the decision (‘go’ and ‘no go’). The results are presented in
Table 4 (for 65 variants the decision-making was still pending or unknown at the time
of analysis and are excluded. Also the pricing policies are excluded). We can see that
in the Dutch practice non-pricing project variants with a negative NPV are associated
with a higher percentage (83%) no go decisions compared to non-pricing variants with
a positive NPV (70 % no go decision). A chi-square test indicates that the bivariate
association between the two variable is significant (χ2 = 7.89, p < 0.05). However,
this effect should be controlled for the influences of other (possible confounding)
variables, which is done in the next section.
Results of themultinominal logit modelWe tested several specifications of themultino-
mial logit model (pricing policies excluded) with CBA information as explanatory
variables. Model specification C will be explained below in ‘missing values analysis’.
Models with interaction effects were also tested, but none of these were found to be
significant. Table 5 presents the main results. Specification A shows that a positive Net
5 Using the dedicated software package Latent Gold 5 (Vermunt and Magidson 2005).
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Table 4 The relation between NPV and ‘go’ and ‘no go’ decision (excluding decisions pending and
unknown and pricing projects)
Decision ‘no go’ (%) Decision ‘go’ (%) Total
NPV negative 83 17 216
NPV positive 70 30 98
Total 79 21 314
Present Value (NPV) for a project variant seems to increase the probability of ‘keep-
ing the variant alive’ (Pending vs. No go), but not to be decisive in the final project
variant choice (Go vs. No go). ‘Keeping a project variant alive’ may also be caused by
specific costs and benefits, as shown in specification B. In particular, low investment
costs and high transport benefits appear to keep a project Pending rather than leading
to a No go decision. An alternative hypothesis is that the decision is not influenced by
the NPV of the specific variant, but by the highest NPV of all the variants. However,
specification D shows that the maximum NPV of all the variants and the difference
between a variant’s specific NPV and the maximum NPV are not significant.
The probability of a Go decision for a specific variant is higher if the inverse of
the number of project variants is higher. This signifies that project variants in projects
with a relatively low number of variants (meaning a relatively high inverse number)
have a higher chance that their decision is Go compared to project variants in projects
with a relatively large number of project variant alternatives. The negative coefficient
for the variable ‘Year’ in Pending versus No go (top half of Table 5) indicates that the
later the CBA was carried out, the higher the chance that the decision is still Pending.
Table 5 also shows that rail projects have a significantly higher probability of getting
a Pending decision compared to No go, but also a lower probability of getting a Go
(see the switch in signs for Rail in Table 5). Apparently it was difficult for Dutch
decision-makers to be decisive with this project category. Possibly, this reflects the
larger technological complexity and associated risks with rail projects compared to
road projects (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002). There are no significant differences between
international, national and regional projects. Also, the involvement of the CPB has no
significant effect.
Results of the Latent Cluster Analysis (LCA) The parameter estimates related to the
indicators were all significant at the 5 % level. Based on the parameter estimates the
profile of each class can be calculated. These profiles are shown in Table 6. In the
present case, the profiles contain three kinds of parameters. Firstly, the unconditional
class membership probabilities, indicating the probabilities that a randomly drawn
project belongs to one of the five classes. These probabilities can be interpreted as
the size of each cluster. Secondly, the (conditional) response probabilities are shown.
These are estimated for the four nominal indicators (decision, project category, CPB
involvement and spatial scale) and indicate the probability of a particular response
given that a project belongs to a particular class. For example, a project belonging to
the first class has a probability of 51 % of having a ‘no go’ decision. And thirdly, the
(conditional) response means, which are estimated for the eight continuous variables
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Table 6 Latent class profiles
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4 Cluster 5
Cluster size (row total = 1) 0.37 0.24 0.16 0.15 0.08
Decision (column total = 1)
No go 0.51 0.68 0.84 0.36 0.90
Go 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.46 0.00
Pending 0.25 0.07 0.12 0.18 0.10
CBA information
Investment (mean billion e) 0.1 0.5 3.3 1.4 2.7
Transport benefits (mean billion e) 0.1 0.3 2.5 1.2 2.0
Indirect effects (mean billion e) 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 0.0
External effects (mean billion e) 0.0 −0.0 −0.1 −0.0 0.0
NPV (mean billion e) −0.0 −0.2 −0.8 −0.4 −0.5
Relative NPV (mean billion e) −0.0 −0.2 −1.5 −0.7 −2.3
Inverse number of variants (mean) 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.1
Project category (total = 1 over columns)
Rail 0.03 0.44 0.44 0.43 0.00
Road 0.49 0.29 0.24 0.17 1.00
Other transport projects 0.48 0.26 0.33 0.40 0.0
CPB involvement (“yes + no” = 1 over columns)
Yes, involved 0.05 0.53 0.56 0.38 1.00
Year (mean) 4.3 6.2 7.5 4.6 6.4
Spatial scale (total = 1 over columns)
Regional 0.84 0.32 0.04 0.45 0.00
National 0.11 0.17 0.85 0.42 1.00
International 0.05 0.52 0.11 0.13 0.00
(investment, transport benefits, indirect effects, external effects, NPV, relative NPV,
the inverse number of variants and year). These indicate the expected mean values
given that a project belongs to a particular class.
The explorative latent class analysis indicates the existence of different classes (or
subsets) underlying the CBA outcomes and decision-making in the Netherlands. The
five clusters are interpreted below.
Cluster 1 is the largest cluster. The cluster represents relatively small project vari-
ants (average investment costs of around 100 million Euros; mainly road and ‘other’
projects) with a small mean negative NPV. The project variants in this cluster (together
with cluster 4) have a lower chance of a ‘no go’ decision compared with clusters 2,
3 and 5. This cluster contains many regional project variants. It has the lowest CPB
involvement of all the clusters and is the ‘youngest’ cluster with an average mean age
for drafting the CBAs of 4.3 years ago (compared to 2012).
Cluster 2 is the second largest cluster, and not very clear. The investment costs
are (again) relatively low and the mean NPV is negative but compared to clusters 3,
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4 and 5 quite modestly negative. The cluster has the highest share of international
project variants of all the clusters. In this cluster ‘pending’ is chosen relatively less
often compared with the other clusters. The share of the ‘go’ decision is the same as in
cluster 1. This cluster has a more or less even mixture of all project variant categories.
Cluster 3 is a relatively small but clear cluster. It represents the very large project
variants (mean investment costs of 3.3 billion Euros) with a relatively high negative
NPV (a mean of −0.8 billion Euro). In line with the MNL model results these project
with very large investment costs have a higher chance of a ‘no go’ than a ‘go’. The
involvement of the CPB in the CBAs for these projects is relatively high. The project
variants are relatively old and the share of regional projects in this cluster is very low.
Cluster 4 is also relatively small. It represents moderately expensive projects (mean
investment costs of 1.4 billion Euros). The mean NPV is negative:−0.4 billion Euros.
Interestingly, this cluster has the highest share of ‘go’ compared to all the other clusters.
If we compare this cluster with clusters 3 and 5 (also large investments projects albeit
both with bigger projects) the main differences are that cluster 4 has a relatively high
share of regional projects, relatively low CPB involvement and a relatively low share
of road projects.
Finally, cluster 5 is the smallest cluster containing expensive national road project
variants (mean investments costs of 2.7 billion Euros). For these variants ‘go’ was
never chosen. The CPB was involved in all the CBAs for these variants.
Additionally to theMLNmodelling, the cluster analysis shows that there are differ-
ent types of transport projects that experience a different type of political process. In
particular, there are two clear dynamics. First, there are many small, regional projects
that have, relatively speaking, a lower chance of being rejected while large, national
(rail) projects tend to have a strong negative NPV and, in line with the CBA, tend to
be rejected relatively often.
Missing values analysis As stated in the method section, missing values on the vari-
ables ‘indirect effects’ and ‘external effects’ were replaced by zero’s. While these
variables did not have significant effects on the decision (in the MNL model) and
also did not discriminate strongly between the latent classes (in the LC model), we
ran an additional MNL model (specification C, Table 5) excluding these variables to
assess whether their inclusion did not ‘distort’ the effects of the other variables. This
proved not to be the case, as differences between this model (specification C) and the
presented model (Table 5, specification B) are minimal.With respect to the latent class
model, we retained the variables (‘indirect benefits’ and ‘external benefits’) in their
original form, so with missing values defined as missing values. This is because the
latent class model can easily handle missing values, as this model is estimated using
full information maximum likelihood. Hence,the parameters are estimated using all
available information for each of the cases. In essence, missing values are skipped in
the ML estimation (see page 51 of Vermunt and Magidson 2005).
6 Concluding remarks
Based on our large-scale study of CBA reports for all transport proposals in theNether-
lands during the period 2000–2012, we did not find a significant statistical relation
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between the welfare assessment of transport projects using a CBA and the variants
chosen in political decisions (after controlling for other relevant variables). However,
a positive NPV does keep variants ‘pending’, preventing a negative decision at least
temporarily. In addition, we found that rail projects faced a higher chance of being
rejected.
It is up to the politicians to decidewhether and towhat extent the efficiency criterion
is important. Thus, the question of whether a stronger relation between aggregate CBA
results and decision-making is required cannot be answered scientifically. However,
it is interesting to note that politicians decided in the year 2000 to make the CBA tool
mandatory but, subsequently, no significant relation between aggregate CBA results
and decisions can be found (at least for the CBAs carried out in the period 2000–2012).
Our conclusion for the case of the Netherlands fits in—broadly speaking—with the
international literature (see Sect. 2). A recommended next step would be to research
the question ‘why’? Annema (2013, see section 2) gives some speculative reasons but
to really understand this limited CBA use in-depth research is required. Is it due to
the quality of the CBAs? Is it their ‘black box’ character? Are there political reasons?
Is there information overload? Is it due to a combination of reasons? The answers to
these questions might improve (if desired) the position of CBA in decision-making
for transportation projects.
Finally, we also noted that decision-making for smaller regional projects seems to
have other characteristics compared to national and international transport projects.
Thus, in further research, it may be wise to give special attention to the position of
CBAs in decision-making for these smaller (often regional) transportation projects.
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